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1 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
With the ongoing trend of urbanisation, it is predicted that by 2050, 68% of the world population will live in cities[41].
Such trend will impose considerable strains on the governance on a local authority level and is already challenging the
way cities manage their resources.
In order to address the challenges arising from the accelerating urbanisation and depletion of finite resources,
cities are moving towards the adoption of a range of approaches across a number of dimensions, one of which is the
technological. More specifically, the technological dimension refers to the use IT and computer network enablers that
can support the delivery of sustainability focused business models. The path and journey for a city in becoming smart
may differ between the cities which may have different problems to solve as well as different starting points. London for
example had challenges in the transportation sector, whereas Barcelona’s main driver was to tackle pollution. In all cases
however, the end state is envisaged to use enabling technologies from the same broad areas: 5G and Software Defined
Authors’ addresses: Paul-David Jarvis, s5115232@bournemouth.ac.uk, BU-CERT, Bournemouth University, Fern Barrow, Poole, UK, BH12 5BB; Amalia
Damianou, BU-CERT, Bournemouth University, Fern Barrow, Poole, UK, BH12 5BB, adamianou@bournemouth.ac.uk; Cosmin Ciobanu, EU Agency
for Cybersecurity (ENISA), Vasilissis Sofias Str 1, Athens, Greece, 151 24, Cosmin.Ciobanu@enisa.europa.eu; Vasilis Katos, BU-CERT, Bournemouth
University, Fern Barrow, Poole, UK, BH12 5BB, vkatos@bournemouth.ac.uk.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not
made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party
components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s).
© 2021 Copyright held by the owner/author(s).
Manuscript submitted to ACM
Manuscript submitted to ACM 1
2 Jarvis and Damianou, et al.
Networks, IoT and Industrial Systems in general, as well as the adoption of cloud and edge computing paradigms. These
technologies would support decision making for planning, managing resources and responding to incidents affecting
supply and demand in real-time.
At the same time, as the business models promoting sustainability emerge and mature, it became apparent that
data-driven Circular Economy is an emerging concept and approach cities should strive to adopt. This in turn led to
the realisation that a city becoming smart is an intermediary stage rather than an end goal. However, achieving a
state where a city is sustainable - or equivalently circular - carries significant risks if an appropriate risk management
plan is not in place. In contrast to traditional cyber systems, smart cities are a melting pot of cyber-physical and
socio-technical systems, where risk transfer occurs between the cyber and physical plane, through two main conduits.
From a cyber-physical system perspective, the transfer of risk occurs through the IoT nodes (sensors and actuators),
whereas from a socio-technical view the risk is transferred from the human nodes. This inevitably leads to a wide
attack surface with an increased scope of the impact affecting not only confidentiality, integrity and availability, but
also privacy and safety.
From a cybersecurity view, attacks on either direct smart city services or its citizens undermines the users’ incentive
to adopt and use these services[1]. As smart cities encompass a wide range of technological domains and themes (see for
example [20] for a comprehensive list of research themes), we argue that vulnerabilities constitute a horizontal theme
cutting across most of the other domains. Moreover, a vulnerability is a key component of any risk based approach as
well as for any attack vector when there is a corresponding exploit available. Vulnerability management is therefore
critical for any local government and authority who engage in smart city initiatives and the scope should extend beyond
the core smart city services and infrastructure, but reach to the end devices; for example, as smart urban services highly
depend on mobile communications, there are cases where local authorities are exploring ways in becoming local Mobile
Network Operators, primarily due to the 5G rollout. A safe and secure city operating a 5G network would need to
consider end to end security along with the QoS aspects and the authority’s lack of ability to frame cybersecurity can
lead to the failure of developing suitable security policies[14].
Our contribution. To our knowledge, the study of vulnerabilities in a smart cities context is primarily theoretical[27][24]
or has not been extensively explored from an empirical evaluation perspective. In fact, most of the empirical studies
on cybersecurity for cities explore practices, capabilities, policies and government involvement[34]. In this paper we
attempt to create a baseline in order to allow the stakeholders of a city to compare their standing and exposure against
cities with similar profiles and characteristics. This is performed by consolidating and correlating (mostly orthogonal)
data from two types of sources: independent studies on the level of achievement and maturity of a city becoming
smart, and actual data from available online, potentially vulnerable devices. With regards to the former, we adopted the
most to date and accepted surveys and metrics assessing smart cities on a number of dimensions. With regards to the
vulnerabilities and exposures we employed and expanded the ENISA 2018-2019 vulnerabilities dataset by extending the
date rage of collection of vulnerabilities, including city exposure information. Through a grounded theory approach we
correlate such information with the other established third party research using city metrics. We focus on vulnerabilities
that correspond to actual devices as captured and indexed by Shodan, an online database which is periodically updated
with device exposure information. This approach is twofold; first, it would allow a local authority (who may be also
running a smart city data centre) to gather and generate actionable threat intelligence at an operational level which can
also help them to conduct a cyber-physical risk assessment. Second, it will help the city to understand the local and
wider threat landscape and prioritise its synergies and collaboration efforts with cities that have a similar exposure
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profile and alike constituencies. By creating the aforementioned baseline, the respective decision maker would be in a
position to develop a contextualised narrative by enriching their position with specific geo-political and social context
and therefore make informed decisions on their vulnerability management processes and cybersecurity investment in
general. For example, we argue that more mature smart cities - that is in terms of achievement of a smart city agenda -
would need to maintain and strictly adhere to vulnerability management plans, as in the opposite case they are open to
an assortment of threats, including hybrid ones, that can directly affect the safety and well-being of their citizens.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the concept of data-driven Circular Economy
for the benefit of the reader who is not familiar with the concept. We particularly focus on data-driven circular cities, as
these subscribe to the interconnected networks and cyber-physical systems paradigms, thus elevating significantly
the impact of a vulnerability. Section 3 describes and elaborates on the smart/circular city maturity model, in order
to illustrate the need for vulnerability contextualisation. Section 4 describes the proposed approach by detailing the
methodology and dataset used, the analysis and discussion on the findings. Section 5 summarizes the main findings and
outlines areas for future research.
2 FROM TRADITIONAL CITIES TO SMART CITIES, TO CIRCULAR CITIES
The transition from a traditional to a smart city is not a new concept, however, it has come to the spotlight during the
recent years. Furthermore, many ICT enablers have reached a maturity level that allow the realisation of the smart city
concept. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) alone in a recent survey captured over 100 definitions for
the term [42].
The term smart city is not the only one to describe a technologically evolved environment. There are many other
terms, like wired city, connected city, intelligent city, digital city, and so forth [31]. Alongside these definitions, a stream
of research focuses on defining not only the dimensions which would characterise a city smart, but also to measure the
level of achievement across these dimensions, that is captured and described under a maturity model.
From a systems perspective, a city can be viewed as a complex system that is continuously evolving, with all of its
components being organised and interconnected in order to perform particular functions or purposes. A smart city can
be viewed as a system of systems [23], a Socio Technical System (STS) [6] and a Cyber Physical System (CPS) [36]. An
STS comprises of the users and/or human assets, who interact with the city infrastructures in meaningful ways, in
order to receive a service or to contribute to a city’s function. User/human interactions are related to the exchanging of
information between both the physical and the cyber plane. Furthermore, users interact with each other.
On the other hand, a Cyber Physical System consists of computation and control components on the one hand and
physical devices and intelligent assets on the other. The intelligent assets can have varying levels of “importance” in the
system, assuming different roles and offering services of different levels of criticality. CPS are mostly implemented
for critical infrastructures and industrial control systems, however, during the last years they have been adopted to
many other domains including smart cities. A city-wide deployment of a CPS must be conducted in a way to ensure
sustainability, safety and security.
A particular milestone for massive CPS deployments is the establishment of the IoT paradigm rooted in 2008, which
marked the introduction of technologies like embedded systems and wireless networks. In essence, smart devices,
sensors and actuators are employed in order to produce, collect and exchange information using wireless networks; at
the same time machine learning approaches were introduced and employed [2] in order to create added value out of the
produced big data.
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In general, smart city is a concept that primarily refers to the adoption of technological enablers in order to enhance
the quality of services that the city provides, with the overall aim to improve the citizens’ quality of life. According to
[31], the majority of smart cities projects include four main attributes that are common, namely sustainability, quality
of life, smartness and urbanisation [38].
It is argued that the adoption of technological enablers in a city-wide scale is a key direction for achieving sustainability.
Some of the major challenges that come along with urbanisation include the waste management, air and noise pollution,
adequacy of resources, traffic issues, citizens health and mental issues, transportation, etc. The use of technological
approaches has changed the conventional concept of a city. Moreover, various studies [38] [19] that have as main topic
the correlation between urbanisation and smart cities, came to a conclusion that the new opportunities through the
usage ICT influence positively the urban wealth.
2.1 Data-driven Circular Economy
As discussed, a smart city should be the epitome of sustainability since any deviation from this would entertain scenarios
of dystopian futures. Since sustainability is one of the main business and societal drivers for transforming a city into a
smart one, there is a requirement to develop a suitable agenda and accompanied business models. The Circular Economy
- CE paradigm is viewed as the sustainability approach whereas ICT may provide the means.
The term Circular Economy is used to describe the economic model where everything has value and nothing is
wasted. This means that assets like materials, devices, services and generally resources are not disposed after the first
usage, but, they are used again and again for a variety of purposes. The main goal of Circular Economy is to maintain
their utility without producing new assets or wasting them before the end of their lifecycle [12]. The main idea behind
Circular Economy is to design products in a smart way so as to be used during their whole lifecycle, be re-used and
re-paired to extend this lifecycle and re-manufactured to create new products [12]. Information and Communication
Technologies can facilitate Circular Economy as it can provide useful information on assets, their location, the condition,
and the performance of assets, in real-time and over time.
According to the Ellen MacArthur Foundation, "A Circular Economy is one that is restorative and regenerative by design,
and which aims to keep products, components and materials at their highest utility and value at all time. It distinguished
between technical and biological cycles as an attempt to minimise leakage and wastage" [32]. Adopting nature inspired
"techniques" on waste recycling/upcycling and reuse, Circular Economy is built on the premise that every material can
be reused in this way in order to be functional again as it will have the opportunity to be regenerated and restored.
Some of the main benefits of Circular Economy involve substantial net material savings, reduced exposure to price
volatility, increased economic development, increased innovation and job creation potential and increased resilience in
living systems and in the economy [32]. In order to achieve the aforementioned highest utility and value, one would
need to enable and maintain information flows, so that timely and fine grained decision making can take place. This in
turn leads to accepting that a CE model would need to be data-driven in order to achieve its goals:
Definition 1. Smart, or data-driven Circular Economy is the utilization of reactive, adaptive, autonomous or collaborative
objects and systems for economic and environmental value creation[26].
In a data-driven CE ecosystem, the management of finite resources and intelligent assets is coordinated by data flows.
Data in turn are also considered to be assets and of a high value. Reciting Clive Humby, who back in 2006 coined the
phrase “Data is the new oil” in an effort to stress that data have become the most valuable resource, it can be seen that
CE would need to be data enabled, or alternatively data-driven, to be able to deliver what it evangelises.
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Fig. 1. A maturity model for a smart, circular city (adapted from [12])
The interplay of CE with the intelligent assets and particular IoT devices leads to the creation of data structures
and patterns, to enable a “circular-by-design” approach. Currently, the prevailing pattern for managing an asset is
that of Location, Condition, Availability. From these three properties, Location and Availability refer to the
geolocation and the state of the asset. These two properties have already proven sufficient to leverage highly profitable
data-driven CE business models, such as in the case of Uber and AirBnB. The Condition property is more esoteric
to CE itself as it is used to describe the state the respective asset is in terms of its lifecycle. An example definition of
this property is {Condition::good|require_repair|recycle}. A complete treatment of this concept is presented in
[29].
3 A SMART CITY MATURITY LEVEL
A maturity model helps in structuring and streamlining the “CE readiness” of a city against a set of dimensions.
Maturity models are widespread in the field of organisational performance as they identify organisational strengths
and weaknesses as well as providing benchmarking information. Popular maturity models include OPM3, CMMI, P3M3,
PRINCE, BPMM, and Kerzner’s Project Management Maturity Model [22]. These models may differ in terms of factors,
number of levels as well as application domains[22].
In this work we adopt the maturity model for smart circular cities as described in [12]. This maturity model is suitable
for illustrating the technological roadmap for a city adopting a CE agenda. In Figure 1, the maturity model paired with
the potential impact of vulnerabilities in the respective level is outlined.
According to this maturity model, the progression from an instrumented to a responsive city involves the following
stages [12]:
• The Instrumented City. This is the first stage of the transition, where the city embeds constellations of sensors
and devices on the physical infrastructures (e.g. bridges, street lights, gas pipes, the grid). At this stage, the
devices perform basic tasks for specific purposes. Almost every device in a city environment is equipped with
sensors that perform constrained tasks and has been employed for narrow and specific purposes.
• The Connected City. This is the stage where connectors between the different constellations are in place. The
existence of these connectors does not necessarily involve any actual exploitation or systematic utilisation of the
available data. The stakeholders are still constrained at this stage, consuming data within their respective sector
or domain, despite the increased heterogeneity of the data.
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• The Smart City. This refers to the stage where all assets are fully interconnected and actionable information
is available to the stakeholders who can reach high levels of situational awareness. The activities of a smart
city environment take place as "back office" operations. Infrastructure operators, utility and service providers
can perform intelligent processing and the local government stakeholders can perform global processing and
maintain an overview of the city’s operations. A smart city is a heterogeneous environment, with different
purpose devices and technologies can be used by various users, stakeholders and citizens. Citizens and visitors
can use their personal devices, such as smartphones and tablets. For this reason, the amount of data that is
produced is vast and facilitates different aspects and services of a city.
• The Responsive City. This stage could be considered as the city’s “self actualisation” level, in resemblance
to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. A responsive city could be considered as a stage where every part of the
city is in a complete sync with its counterparts. This means that humans, intelligent assets and all the other
components have access to information in real time, which will be in an appropriate and accessible format. In this
way, intelligent assets and smart city infrastructures will be in a position to dynamically reconfigure network
and physical structures when it is necessary in order to address the citizens needs, by balancing supply and
demand. Ultimately, the city is able to adjust itself depending on the circumstances, as living organisms do. A
representative use case is the increased gatherings of people, such as social events or incidents, where the safety
of citizens and visitors is at stake. Furthermore, the city itself can address and respond to the needs of people
before these needs are expressed and avoidance of difficulties, before they take place. Offering capabilities to the
city’s assets to participate in real-time decision making by reconfiguring its resources in order to meet the needs
of the stakeholders and beneficiaries, defines in essence the sentient city.
It is fairly evident that reaching the responsive city level of maturity would require - from a technological perspective
- to achieve high levels of connectivity and integration with software services that are delivered in the whole vertical. A
representative example is Software Defined Networks, where the network resources and topology is fully defined and
controlled by software. As such, the impact of a vulnerability being exploited at a particular maturity level is expected
to increase, as one traverses from a lower to a higher level. This suggests that a vulnerability will carry a larger amount
of risk, the higher the maturity level this vulnerability will be placed on. More formally, if 𝑅𝑚 (·) is some risk calculation
function with𝑚 denoting the maturity level, then for a particular vulnerability 𝑣 the following should hold:
𝑅𝑖 (𝑣) ≤ 𝑅 𝑗 (𝑣)
for 𝑖 < 𝑗 . This means that if two cities have an identical vulnerability profile, the city with the highest maturity
will also have the highest risk. This is captured in some quantitative vulnerability measurement systems such as the
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)[17][28], where the resulting severity of a vulnerability can be adjusted
and subject to the so-called environmental variables. To the best of our knowledge, the development of a methodology
for producing a suitable vulnerability scoring system with an environmental metric group for a smart city infrastructure
remains a research challenge, see for example[45] where although a concise threat and risk model for smart cities
is proposed, there is limited evidence on how the environmental CVSS score dimension is populated. In fact, the
CVSS measurement system itself has received criticism from the research and practitioner communities[21][18] with
alternatives being proposed (see for example[39]) but despite its shortcomings, it has still been applied to and validated
through a variety of contexts and scenarios[10]. In any case, the two main characteristics of a risk based approach
for a vulnerability driven assessment system would require a vulnerability measuring system and a risk methodology
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that considers interdependent networks[35]. While these aspects are outside the scope of this work, we argue that
the narratives included in the proposed approach could be adapted to develop a suitable risk management approach
informed by vulnerability exposure.
In the remainder of this paper we conduct an empirical evaluation of the current state of vulnerabilities as these
exist in cities. We explore the existence of potential differences or patterns of vulnerabilities in a collection of cities that
can be used to infer practices, behaviours and other risk factors.
4 ACTIONABLE THREAT INTELLIGENCE THROUGH VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT
4.1 Datasets - limitations of research
For this research, datasets from two primary domains were considered. The first domain covers the independent factors
or variables of the study and is primarily composed from the descriptors of cities as expressed by the cities in motion
research[7]. The dependent variables are primarily covered from the cybersecurity dataset. To this end, we extended
the ENISA vulnerabilities 2018-2019 dataset[16][15]. This dataset comprised contextualised vulnerability data from
a number of sources. Starting from the curated list of vulnerabilities in the NVD database, these were enriched with
tactics and techniques as specified by the ATT&CK framework1 as well as the exploit database2. Although the original
ENISA dataset contained also information from Shodan on the number of exploits, it did not include information on the
actual exposure - that is, a view of actual devices that are potentially vulnerable to a particular exploit. For the purpose
of this research, we extended the ENISA dataset to contain such information.
Moreover, the geolocation of the IP addresses of the vulnerable devices was used to pivot between the vulnerability
and city/country domain data. As such, we ended up with a dataset of vulnerabilities attached to devices that in
turn were mapped to geographical locations. Hence, the accuracy of geolocation is limited and bounded by Shodan’s
geo-mapping process. To this end, in order to avoid ambiguity on the city data and overcome any city synonyms, the
queries for the geolocation searches consisted of the (country, city) tuple.
A noteworthy limitation of this research is the fact that there was no identification information on the type of
service or direct attribution of ownership of the vulnerable devices. This means that we observe the city as a whole
rather than distinguishing the different services, sectors (e.g. separation between critical infrastructure and household
devices and so forth); such information is crucial in a fully blown interconnected networks approach. In addition to
this, the collection does not cover IPv6 and as such a potentially substantial volume of IoT devices was not taken into
consideration. This may affect the actual results of relatively more mature smart cities and especially those that have
already deployed 5G, so we accept that the findings in the present study represent the best case scenario and the lower
bound of the attack surface. In addition, exclusion of IPv6 would limit the scope to more “traditional" and core services.
Nevertheless, this limitation, together with the geolocation approach shows the need for a city’s NOC/SOC equivalent
to invest in asset discovery and a register which from a practical perspective this is a non-trivial task. Furthermore,
any IP addresses exposing devices through VPN or TOR networks were not filtered out, as these were not expected to
introduce any significant bias in the analysis.
It should be noted that, as with all exercises of joining data from different sources, the end dataset may have sparse
entries. Although there are approaches to increase the sample population of a given feature with a low number of data
points (see for example ML based dataset imputation applied on the ENISA dataset [37]), this was not required for this
study. A summary of the features of the resulting dataset used is presented in Table 1. In addition to the vulnerabilities
1https://attack.mitre.org
2https://www.exploit-db.com/about-exploit-db
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and city data, we also employed ITU’s Global Cybersecurity Index, GCI[43]. This metric reflects a country’s commitment
to cybersecurity and is compiled from 25 measured indicators across five pillars: legal, technical, organisational, capacity
building and cooperation.
Table 1. Dataset description
Vulnerabilities City metrics
source features source features
NVD[33] CVE, CVSS Cities in Motion[7] 96 variables over 9 indicator cate-
gories, including population, human
capital, technology, city in motion
score
Shodan #vulnerable devices, geoloca-
tion
IMD[8] adoption of digital technologies, cit-
izen perceptions, smart city ranking
MITRE[30] CWE C40[11] leading CE cities
Another limitation of this study is the volatility of the results due to the nature of the live vulnerability exposure
data. More specifically, the data recorded from Shodan (Sentient Hyper-Optimised Data Access Network), a search
engine designed to gather and index information about internet-connected devices and systems, represent a snapshot in
a particular time. Shodan’s command line interface (CLI) allows users to develop scripts in Bash language to automate
the collection of results. The scripts that were created to automatically scrape the data contained several queries needed
to collect the desired data. Apart from the queries to retrieve port, device type, product type and protocol, the following
four queries were the most important:
• vuln: This query returns devices vulnerable to a given vulnerability such as MS17-010 or CVE-2017-15906.
• count: This query returns the total amount of devices. For example, in November 2020, 7,647,885 devices were
vulnerable to CVE-2017-15906.
• country: This query returns the number of devices from a specific country.
• city: This query returns the number of devices from a specific city.
For the purpose of this study, the vulnerability data were used to explore whether potentially significant relationships
may exist between these types of data and other, orthogonal dimensions (such as behavioural and economic variables).
In a real life deployment, it would be more appropriate to collect and maintain historical vulnerability data in order to
run longitudinal research which is expected to provide actionable information of a higher quality. To this end, other
vulnerability exposure databases can be considered such as Censys3 and Zoomeye4; it is noteworthy mentioning that the
latter contains historical exposure information. In addition, as the exposure metric is based on Shodan’s methodology
of assigning CVEs to devices and services, the accuracy of the results and findings are bounded by Shodan’s disclaimer
of implied vulnerabilities.
Lastly, with regards to the quantitative measures of vulnerabilities, this study inherits the limitations and issues
surrounding the CVSS scoring convention. Specifically, although the CVSS approach is in principle founded on widely
acceptable methodologies and is considered trustworthy [21], its use and applications introduce conflicts with regards to
the assignment of the actual values and ground truth. Indicatively, the National Vulnerability Database that can be viewed
3https://censys.io/
4https://www.zoomeye.org/
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to maintain an authoritative record of CVSS scores shows a substantially low correlation of some of impact measures
(Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) between CVSS version 2 and version 3. More specifically, the correlation of
integrity and availability between the two versions were found to be 0.34 and 0.38 respectively[15].
4.2 Analysis and findings
The analysis that follows is two-fold. Firstly, we use the available datasets as means for evaluating whether these
published, available data are aligned with, or can interpret or support assumptions and policy directions as stated in the
recent literature. Secondly, we present a series of approaches smart city stakeholders could adopt when developing
vulnerability management capabilities.
The analysis also follows a top-down approach. We initially analyse data on a city aggregate level and evaluate
the counties vulnerability exposure by considering additional macroeconomic measures. We then move on to city
comparisons and finally we focus on the cities themselves.
In order to develop meaningful comparisons, we use the population variable to normalise the vulnerability data.
There are two approaches for doing this, namely dividing the vulnerability variables by the population, or adding the
latter to the set of independent variables in the regression model(s). Furthermore, we define the vulnerability exposure




|𝑣 | ∗ 𝑏𝑣
where 𝑉𝑐 is the multiset of discovered vulnerabilities for 𝑐 and 𝑏𝑣 is the CVSS base score of vulnerability 𝑣 . As the
vulnerability exposure failed the Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality test, we consider the natural logarithm values 𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑐 )
instead, as this variable follows a normal distribution (K-S significance: 0.604), which allows the construction and testing
of the regression models.
4.2.1 Scope: Country. A country level study can facilitate the contextualisation of the vulnerabilities exposure as this
can bring in country indices and factors, which to an extent encapsulate the historical efforts and profile of the country
on geo-pollitical matters. Analysis on a country level can be a good reference and baseline to build a pragmatic cyber
situational awareness capacity. For instance, a city’s investment budget is normally comprised of funding external to
the city (funding of national or international origin such as from international research bodies or other organisations)
as well as through income from its primary stakeholders (citizens, businesses) in the form of a tax. Assuming that the
GDP of a country is a factor that relates to the cybersecurity investment and capacity[13] [9],
Table 2 summarizes the results of the regression analysis on the vulnerabilities exposure against the independent
variables, GDP, GCI and population. The Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) are all less than 10 - or, alternatively the
Tolerance values are greated than 0.1 - showing that there is no co-linearity between the interpretive variables. The
adjusted 𝑅2 is significant, where it is shown that the Global Cybersecurity Index is the strongest of the three in explaining
the level of exposure. More specifically, although the GDP and population result in the increase of the attack surface, the
GCI also follows a positive correlation overall. In essence, as the GDP increases so does the investment in networked
devices, but countries do also seem to invest in improving their cybersecurity capabilities at the same time, as captured
by the GCI. However, this does not suggest that all countries follow such practice; outlier countries who are on a low
GCI score with high exposure may not have an effective vulnerability management plan. At the time of writing, the
countries with the highest exposure and lowest GCI are Cape Verde, Palau and Eritrea. Interestingly, at the time of
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Table 2. Country regression model
Model Info Model Fit
Observations:177 F(3,173)=27845, p=0.000
Dependent variable: log_exposure 𝑅2 = 0.326
Type: OLS Adj. 𝑅2 = 0.314
Coefficients Collinearity stats
B std. error 𝛽 T p Tolerance VIF
intercept 11.177 0.268 41.640 .000
GDP 2.973e-005 0.000 0.218 2.917 .004 0.699 1.431
GCI 3.939 0.852 0.353 4.623 .000 0.667 1.498
population 3.501e-009 ,000 0.210 3.232 .001 0.921 1.086
writing (Q1 of 2021), the government of Cape Verde approved the establishment of a national CSIRT and a National
Cybersecurity Centre together with the introduction of a legislative framework[40]. This is a timely development, as a
country with a high exposure and a low cybersecurity investment can potentially be an easy target and the adoption of
security controls and measures is imperative.
It should be highlighted that the regression model described above is vulnerability management practices agnostic; a
high GCI score indicates that there may be a vulnerability management scheme in place, but there is no explicit metric
for that - other than the generic technical and capacity building pillars. As such, the government of a country could use
this model to benchmark their position and compare where their actual exposure against the estimated value. This in
turn would allow them to strategise and prioritise on a vulnerability management program.
Another metric showing the cybersecurity effort in relation to the exposure is the log of the ratio between 𝐸𝑐 and GCI.
This metric is normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk test significance: 0.056), with a mean of 14.685, standard deviation
of 2.28 and within the range of [9.73, 20.92]. Countries placed on the low end of the distribution have potentially
over-invested in cybersecurity considering their actual attack surface, whereas countries with a value close to 20 may
be overexposed.
4.2.2 Scope: City. Moving on to a cities view, a broad analysis considers the cities based on their current maturity level
and agendas. To this end, we considered four classes of cities:
Class 1: the plain city, referring to those cities that have not indicated progress or intention to implement a smart city
agenda;
Class 2: the circular city, referring to cities that have a CE agenda, but have not explicitly considered to implement this
adopting a clear data-driven approach;
Class 3: the smart city, referring to cities that are evaluated and included in the IMD or Cities in Motion study;
Class 4: the both city, referring to cities that are smart and also have a CE agenda, as specified in the C40 dataset.
As it is advocated that CE cannot be delivered without the data-driven dimension employing technological ICT
enablers [5] [3], we argue that cities that have a set CE agenda, have also a more definitive and mature technological
roadmap than other cities.
Figure 2 summarises the pairwise vulnerability means comparisons of the different classes of cities. In all cases the
average CVSS base score revolves around the mid 7s with the plain cities exhibiting the highest mean and standard
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deviation. With regards to these comparisons, all cities show significant differences except plain and circular cities
where their differences were not significant.
𝑁 #CVE mean std
plain 87 16.8m 7.580 0.463
circular 5 6.2K 7.533 0.186
smart 91 22m 7.541 0.239
both 11 7m 7.339 0.175
Fig. 2. Pairwise comparisons of the four city classes
However, this first exploratory analysis is limited as a comparison of means is a static approach. In addition, the
sample of the cities with a circular only agenda is relatively small (𝑁 = 5) so we consider a further class motion that
contains all cities that are showing early signs of “smartness" (very low in the maturity scale), yet clearly higher than the
plain cities who have not declared any smart city initiatives. The city type remains an ordinal, discrete variable with
the ascending order of plain, motion, smart, both and in this case includes all cities that have been included in the
independent studies and respective datasets. Such arrangement allows the construction of the following hypotheses:
𝐻1 The city type moderates the vulnerability exposure such that it is higher for smarter cities than plainer cities.
𝐻2 The vulnerability exposure in cities increases with their population.
𝐻3 The vulnerability exposure in cities decreases with their level of technology.
The focus of 𝐻1 is on the overall exposure rather than the severity score. This is an assumption stemming from the
fact that smarter cities become more dependable on technology; technology is more pervasive in smart cities and the
cyber attack surface is expected to be bigger than in a plain city. On the other hand, for 𝐻3 we assume that a high
technology score will have a negative relation with exposure. This is also in agreement with the particular definition of
this indicator in the Cities in Motion study, as it includes indicators that measure innovation, the web index measuring
the economic, social and political benefit obtained from the Internet as well as the registered users on social media,
broadband speed, WiFi coverage and so forth. On face value, some of these indicators may be expected to increase
exposure, but we also expect that a high technological achievement also requires talent and expertise in cybersecurity
in providing a secure and safe infrastructure to the citizens. Nevertheless, as technology is one of many factors that is
expected to influence the vulnerability exposure, it may not be sufficient to “drag" exposure down; it is well accepted
that cybersecurity cannot be addressed by solely technical means and other factors (such as human aspects when the
subject of the study is a socio-technical system) need to be taken into consideration.
In Tables 3 and 4, the regression results are presented. In model 1, the independent variable city_type refers to the
four city classes (with circular being replaced by motion). This variable is exploded to its different types in model 2
to validate 𝐻1. Note that there is no intercept in this model in order to avoid multicollinearity due to the explosion of
the type variable.
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Table 3. City Regression model 1
Model Info Model Fit
Observations:170 F(3,166)=16727, p=0.000
Dependent variable: exposure 𝑅2 = 0.231
Type: OLS Adj. 𝑅2 = 0.217
Coefficients
B std. error 𝛽 T p
intercept 793555.776 743060.891 1068 .287
population .187 .038 0.348 4891 .000
technology -20047.553 4737.873 -.304 -4231 .000
city_type 775686.647 276255.132 .196 2808 .006
The results are significant and confirm the hypotheses 𝐻2 and 𝐻3. For 𝐻2 in particular, we can see that it also holds
by observing the 𝛽 coefficients that confirm the order of the city types in accordance to our initial hypothesis, with the
smarter cities being more exposed than the plainer cities. This in turn confirms also the fact that technology alone is
not sufficient to address cybersecurity issues.
Table 4. Regression model 2
Model Info Model Fit
Observations:171 F(6,164)=16290, p=0.000
Dependent variable: exposure 𝑅2 = 0.372
Type: OLS Adj. 𝑅2 = 0.349
Coefficients
B std. error 𝛽 T p
population .190 .040 .414 4746 .000
technology -19471.425 4977.282 -.543 -3.912 .000
motion 1706746.558 621010.315 .278 2.748 .007
smart 2175288.130 496238.743 .405 4.384 .000
plain 2180776.000 763190.887 .220 2.857 .005
both 5468921.448 975307.816 .364 5.607 .000
Figure 3 shows the results of hierarchical clustering (Ward’s method) of vulnerabilities on the cities that have declared
a smart and circular agenda (class both). This information can be actionable in two ways. First, it would allow the
local authorities to prioritise and team up with those authorities of the cities that seem to have similar vulnerabilities
and exposure profile. Such intelligence could contribute to information sharing and operational cooperation activities.
Assuming that CSIRTs on a local authority level are established - say through forming their own local authority CSIRT
network - the councils could form operational cooperation structures with selective peers. At the time of writing, the
closest CSIRTs to supporting a local authority are primarily operators of essential services (such as healthcare, transport,
utiliy services and so forth, see ENISA’s CSIRT interactive map5). Second, any attacks mounted to a city of a similar
vulnerability profile could act as an early warning for the unaffected yet similar city. The absence of geo-political
contextualisation of the data at this level would restrict the benefit of this approach to thwarting scatter-gun type of
5https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/csirts-in-europe/csirt-inventory/certs-by-country-interactive-map
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Fig. 3. Hierarchical clustering of cities having a smart and CE agenda (class:both)
attacks, such as Mirai and Wannacry which had devastating consequences not to the economy but also to safety. In
essence, such an approach would help a local authority to effectively triage across the hundreds of cities and establish
information sharing with peer authorities for the purpose of increasing their situational awareness and improving their
responses to cybersecurity incidents. As an example on how the vulnerability exposure information can be leveraged
from the clusters shown in Figure 3, Paris and Amsterdam are grouped under the same cluster and as such exhibit
similarities on potential vulnerabilities. This would trigger an additional analysis and study to see why these two
cities are grouped together and an example direction would be to inspect the exposure profiles against the types of
devices, protocols and whenever possible, sectors. Both Amsterdam and Paris have made significant progress in smart
building infrastructures, with Amsterdam maintaining the most celebrated circular office building to date. “The Edge”, is
designed and built for the headquarters of Delloite in Amsterdam and is considered the most intelligent office building
in the world[44] with 28K sensors, and a state of the art data centre, constantly monitoring and controlling the internal
environment. Paris on the other hand has a concentration of almost half of innovative startups in the smart building
industry[4].
Table 5 contains the results of a factor analysis performed on the top 20 cities with the highest exposure and potential
exploitability to vulnerabilities. The analysis produced three factors (groups) in total, with a significantly high alpha
(over 0.7) in all cases, showing strong internal consistency and that the respective dimensions (cities in our case) can be
reduced and represented by their assigned groups (factors).
In Table 6, the weakness profile of the four city classes is shown. Although there seem to be differences in the
distribution of the weaknesses across the classes, this is an oversimplified overview offering a coarse level comparison
between these city classes and needs to be further contextualised and substantiated in order to extract actionable
information. A metric prescribing the percentage of most dangerous weaknesses (as agreed by the community) would
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Table 5. Factor Analysis (loadings) of top 20 cities with the most potential vulnerabilities
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Ashburn 0.7724 Sydney 0.7245 Chicago 0.9596
Tokyo 0.6910 Central 0.8390 Miami 0.8154
London 0.9050 Incheon 0.8180 Buffalo 0.9574










Cronbach’s alpha 0.9614 0.9335 0.9130
Bartlett’s sphericity test: chi square: 24144.232 p-value : 0.000
offer opportunities for comparison, which can also be performed on a city level granularity, comparing like-to-like
cities (in terms of economic or other maturity dimensions). Interestingly, the cities that have both a smart and circular
agenda have the least percentage of most dangerous weaknesses. This finding, is in agreement with the results in Figure
2, where the both class shows the lowest mean across all cities, although the weakness profile data refer to unique
counts of a particular weakness per city rather than the totals (as in the case of the mean CVSS base scores).
Table 6. Weakness profile per city class
CWE plain circular smart both
20*: Improper Input Validation ✓ ✓
399: Resource Management Errors ✓ ✓
119*: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer ✓ ✓
384: Session Fixation ✓ ✓
416*: Use After Free ✓
787*: Out-of-bounds Write ✓ ✓
287*: Improper Authentication ✓ ✓ ✓
476*: NULL Pointer Dereference ✓ ✓ ✓
732*: Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource ✓
444: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ✓
126: Buffer Over-read ✓
200*: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor ✓
320: Key Management Errors ✓
362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ✓
390: Detection of Error Condition Without Action ✓
400*: Detection of Error Condition Without Action ✓
*In top 25 most dangerous software weaknesses list[30]: 75% 83% 80% 16%
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4.2.3 Scope: Human aspects. Notwithstanding the fact that the scope of software vulnerabilities and exposures lies
within the realm of interconnected devices, an analysis of a sociotechnical basis is a fundamental approach when
assessing factors that are potentially capable of moderating and regulating these vulnerabilities from a non-technical
approach. To this end, Table 7 shows the results of a backward step-wise regression with exposure being the dependent
variable; the initial dependent variables were human_capital, social_cohesion, technology as defined in Cities
in Motion as well as the three city classes, plain, smart and both. The circular class was omitted again due to the
low number of observations. Interestingly, the backward regression completed after four rounds (models) where in
every round a variable was removed. The end result included human_capital, smart and both. This is a remarkable
result showing that smart cities, smart cities with a CE agenda and human capital are significant in predicting the
vulnerability exposure, even more important that technology maturity. From the 𝛽 coefficients, smart and circular
cities are more vulnerable than smart cities (with no circular agenda), showing indeed that smart, circular cities are
likely to be more technologically “hungry”, highlighting the data-driven nature of CE, but at the same time are more
exposed. This finding can also be used to validate, to some extent, the adopted maturity model for smart, circular cities.
Moreover, the negative sign of the 𝛽 coefficient for human capital shows an inverse relationship between this factor
and vulnerability exposure. Although not surprising, the significance of this finding is appreciated if we look into the
rationale and indicators of the human capital construct. From the Cities in Motion study ([7], p.11):
“The main goal of any city should be to improve its human capital. A city with smart governance must be capable of
attracting and retaining talent, creating plans to improve education, and promoting both creativity and research."
Moreover, the human capital variable is comprised of 10 indicators most of which focus on education and culture,
such as number of universities that are in the top 500 list, expenditure on education per capita, international movement
of higher-level students, but also number of theatres per city, expenditure on leisure and recreation. All in all, informed
by this model we would dare to argue that a “sophisticated city is a (potentially) secure city”.
Interestingly, all the above empirical findings can be summed up by the position of [27], referencing [14][25]:
“considering the way humans, government, and technology interact, security education is desirable to strengthen the
knowledge of government officials and citizens with regard to cybersecurity issues". Such positions reinforce the complex
and interdisciplinary nature of cybersecurity; starting from studying the vulnerabilities and an exposure of a particular
conurbation which, in essence is dependent of and defined by a wealth of factors, we discover significant relationships
and dependencies of the exposure and many of these factors. The latter are both technological and human, as measured
by the independent studies. Having created a model showing the expected exposure of a city and comparing this against
the actual exposure (as measured by services like Shodan which was used in this current study), would allow the city’s
planners, stakeholders and policy makers to reflect on their particular case by factoring in their own geo-political
context and take informed decisions on the required cybersecurity investment and vulnerability management and
incident response capabilities in particular.
It is also worth reporting that the regression was also ran with exposure_per_person being the dependent variable.
In this case, the most significant model contained the factors technology, both and plain. In other words, if the size
of the population is used to normalise the vulnerability exposure, the technology factor becomes more prevalent.
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND OUTLOOK
Extending the scope of data by including feeds from sources orthogonal to cybersecurity can offer added value to
cyber threat intelligence and increased situational awareness. We demonstrated that the injection of open data from
published smart city studies into the vulnerabilities domain can offer insights into the factors affecting the vulnerability
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Table 7. Backward regression results
Model Info Model Fit
Observations:173 F(3,169)=5738, p=0.000
Dependent variable: exposure 𝑅2 = 0.163
Type: OLS Adj. 𝑅2 = 0.148
Coefficients
B std. error 𝛽 T p
intercept 1849657.449 599408.291 3.086 .002
human_capital -13431.430 4856,886 -.204 -2.765 .006
smart 1103603.507 501319.562 .166 2.201 .029
both 4214523.878 1036497.640 .296 4.066 .000
exposure of a particular socio-technical ecosystem. In particular, this work focused on smart cities and to this end the
vulnerability exposure was considered against a smart city maturity model to enable the development of a meaningful
and contextualised risk based approach using vulnerability impact and exposure data.
Although the datasets usedwere from independently conducted studies or sources, we observed statistically significant
relationships. The underlying hypotheses were confirmed and there were no instances where the data contradicted
widely accepted beliefs and positions of the cybersecurity community, such as the increased exposure of an advanced
smart city and the fact that investing on the human capital is key to reducing the cybersecurity risks.
The proposed approach has a wide range of research directions and practical implications. Cities are challenged
in the ways they fundamentally operate; their governance and business models are substantially revised to meet the
expectations of their citizens who are congruent to end users of the introduced ICT infrastructures. In such deployments
of devices on a massive scale, cyber situational awareness and incident response capabilities would need to be adequately
defined from the outset. As such, identifying a common ground between cybersecurity approaches and local governance
is a significant activity. Practices such as establishing a city level CSIRT and coordination with other peer CSIRTs, cyber
certification schemes for smart city products and services are a few examples of activities for improving the risk posture
and controlling the vulnerability exposure of a city.
Short term future research involves the development of an integrated model of vulnerabilities in smart, circular
cities by performing structured equation modelling (SEM) on the indicators of the non-vulnerability related data, such
as those described in the Cities in Motion and the IMD world digital competitiveness data that include the citizens’
perceptions and adoption of smart city technologies. From the vulnerabilities perspective, further enrichment of the
data with standardised CTI indicators such as ATT&CK’s techniques and tactics, CAPEC and so forth, is expected to
offer additional insights on the city’s exposure and facilitate more efficient decision making.
A limitation of this research is the coarse level of granularity on the city data and absence of context, since every city
and country have their own distinct paths and trajectories in the geo-political plane. Although from a vulnerabilities
and exposure perspective there may not be significant discriminators, however, from a risk perspective there can be
considerable contrasts. In order to appreciate the subtle differences, we can distinguish between scatter-gun type of
attacks (such as Wannacry), and targeted, specific attacks (such as Stuxnet or the more recent ransomware attacks
on critical infrastructures, see the Colonial Pipeline attack) which are lately also acknowledged as hybrid threats.
Scatter-gun type of attacks do not discriminate by geographic location and the underlying probability of a successful
attack would be comparable across all cities matching the right vulnerability profile. In this case the impact of the
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(same type of) attack would be different, depending on the city maturity level, and the models proposed in this research
can be used to both understand how a city performs against a baseline of alike cities, but also to develop an incident
response plan and decide on the prioritisation of information sharing with other peer cities. With regards to the targeted
attacks, the stakeholders should again compare their position relative to the baseline and factor in their geo-pollitical
parameters in order to assess whether their standing is adequate given their context. A medium term research direction
that would allow the development of a incident response and vulnerability management plan involves the introduction
of sector specific device information to further enrich the vulnerabilities descriptions. This will enable the study of
vulnerabilities using theory and approaches from the interdependent networks domain. From an operational level, it
will allow further interpretation and consequently obtain more added value from the critical weaknesses (Table 6).
Defining the boundaries of the different constellations of subsystems and performing segmentation of the constituencies
would allow the definition of different risk areas (such as core critical infrastructure components to mobile ad hoc
Machine-to-Machine as well as end user/citizen realms) which in turn would enable the creation of more efficient
resource management capabilities and finer tuned incident response capacity.
Lastly, enriching the datasets with finer-grained contextual and qualitative information (such as the geo-political
context) would enable a tighter coupling of the triptych comprised of vulnerability management, risk assessment and
incident response processes. The impact and severity quantification of the vulnerabilities would better be reflected in the
quantitative descriptors, such as the CVSS scores. As a future research activity, the first step for capturing the different
impact levels of a given vulnerability across the different cities would be through the adjustment of the environmental
scores depending on the smart city maturity level; this can be estimated by using the regression models as presented in
this work. Having an agreed or expected environmental score for a given maturity level, it would be possible to allow
some automated adjustments of a CVSS final score. In principle, the higher the maturity level, the higher the CVSS
environmental scores should be. However, by introducing the city’s geo-political context, it would be possible to further
tweak and refine the final score. This would make the vulnerability severity and impact scoring system appropriate for
feeding into the risk assessment process. The residual risk in turn would then be considered for developing effective and
appropriate incident response capabilities. By maintaining the view of a smart city being an interconnected network
running critical infrastructures with a variety of stakeholders, the residual risk could be used for making a business
case of deploying CSIRTs on a city or local authority level. From a governance perspective we envisage such CSIRTs to
be placed below the respective National CSIRTs and at the same level of Law Enforcement entities and utility providers,
forming information sharing and cooperation networks on such layer. This would not only allow the development of
attainable and realistic vulnerability management processes, but would foster effective incident response capabilities.
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